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Abstract
Environmental policies frequently target the ratio of dirty to
green output within the same industry. To achieve such targets the
green sector may be subsidised or the dirty sector be taxed. This
paper shows that in a monopolistic competition setting the two
policy instruments have diﬀerent welfare eﬀects. For a strong green
policy (a severe reduction of the dirty sector) a tax is the dominant
instrument. For moderate policy targets, a subsidy will be superior
(inferior) if the initial situation features a large (small) share of dirty
output. These ﬁndings have implications for policies such as the
Californian Zero Emission Bill or the EU Action Plan for Renewable
Energy Sources.
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11 Introduction
Environmental policies frequently aim at greening particular industries by
improving their ratio of clean to polluted production or consumption. The
California Air Resources Board in its Low-Emission Vehicle regulation of
1991 required that by 2003 10% of all newly registered cars be zero-emission
vehicles (ZEV); see CARB (1998) and Kazimi (1997). Similarly, the Euro-
pean Union Action Plan for Renewable Energy Sources states that by 2010
the share of renewable energies in gross domestic energy consumption in the
EU shall reach 12% (European Commission, 1997). Also, in Germany a law
from 1991 sets a minimum quota of 72% for beverages being sold in reusable
containers (Verpackungsverordnung, 1998). In order to achieve these type
of ratio targets (green quotas), it is necessary to make producers and con-
sumers substitute environmentally friendly variants for dirty products from
the same industry. Apart from command and control measures, such as pro-
hibitions and standards, or voluntary agreements, which in fact anticipate
quota-enforcement by decree, the main tools for changing production and
consumption patterns are market-based instruments like taxes and subsidies.
The reasoning is that the prices of green and dirty goods can be modiﬁed to
induce producers and consumers to alter their supply and demand decisions,
which in turn will eventually change the ratio of dirty to green output.
We analyse how these tools help to implement a green quota most eﬃ-
ciently in terms of welfare.1 In principle, any targeted quota or ratio between
dirty and green products can be achieved either by taxing the dirty sector
or by subsidising the green sector of the industry in question. Yet, the two
policy instruments will have diﬀerent impacts on tax income, and they will
aﬀect industry proﬁts as well as ﬁrm entry and the number of green and
dirty variants if there is imperfect competition, product diﬀerentiation and
endogenous market structures. One way of modelling these various forces –
and the approach taken here – is Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) type monopolistic com-
petition. It provides a consistent framework where consumers value product
variety and where product diﬀerentiation, economies of scale and market en-
try exist. Furthermore, since it is inherently a general equilibrium approach,
the full consequences of redistributing or collecting taxes (the latter in order
to pay a subsidy) can be studied, and, not least, there is a clear measure of
welfare, because it takes its starting point in the consumer utility function.
This approach, though widely used in industrial and international economics,
1This means that the paper is not concerned with the rationale underlying a policy
that sets ﬁxed target ratios of green to dirty output; instead we focus on the welfare
implications of obtaining such ratio targets.
2has found relatively little application in environmental economics.2
It is well-known that market-based tools like taxes and subsidies are, com-
pared to other measures, superior in terms of economic eﬃciency if they ad-
dress environmental externalities and if markets feature perfect competition
(e.g. Baumol and Oates, 1988). Moreover, comparison of taxes and subsidies
under diﬀerent market structures show that the eﬀectiveness of instruments
can deteriorate due to monopoly power of producers (see the seminal work of
Buchanan, 1969). Another strand of literature discusses second-best environ-
mental policy instruments under the presence of product market distortions
and international trade (Carraro et al., 1996).3 In contrast to the usual
Pigouvian-style environmental taxes versus subsidies comparisons, which de-
part from an externality problem, we assume that policy-makers – no matter
how they deﬁne environmental quality – decide exogenously on a production
or consumption ratio between green and dirty substitutes for the industry
in question. Thus, because the environmental target is given and achieved
in either policy scenario, environmental damage from the dirty sector need
not enter explicitly consumers’ utility. Therefore, we abstract from the ex-
ternality issue to obtain a clear analysis of how best to enforce politically
determined quotas in terms of welfare by using taxes or subsidies.4
The paper ﬁnds that welfare depends on the choice of instrument and on
the ‘strictness’ of the policy target. As utility crucially depends on substi-
tution elasticities between the dirty and green sector, i.e. the inter-sectoral
elasticity of substitution, and on consumers’ love of variety within one sec-
tor, i.e. the intra-sectoral elasticity of substitution, these parameters also
determine the policy level at which taxes dominate subsidies and vice versa.
If the green quota target aims at a severe reduction of the dirty sector, then
a tax is the welfare dominant instrument for all parameter constellations.
2Other authors that use Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) type monopolistic competition settings
to study environmental policy issues and instruments include Heijdra and van der Ploeg
(1995), Haupt (2000) and Vetter (2001). These papers address optimality when inducing
abatement or reducing an externality. In contrast, the present paper takes the broader view
of welfare optimality when implementing a certain – exogeneously given – environmental
policy target, i.e. the ratio of dirty to green.
3See also Conrad and Wang (1993) who show the interaction between environmental
policy choices and imperfect competitive markets. Ulph (1999) presents an overview of
strategic environmental policy. Pﬂ¨ uger (2001) applies a monopolistic competition model
to ecological dumping.
4It is widely recognised in the environmental economics literature that the choice of
an environmental target can be made on various grounds. For example in a political
economy context, the choice of a certain quota can be motivated by maximisation of a
political support function including green voters and industry lobbyists (See Schulze and
Ursprung, 1998).
3Yet, for a wide range of moderate policy targets, a subsidy will be superior if
the initial situation features a large share of dirty output and consumption.
These results help explain current policy approaches which implement quotas
for speciﬁc sectors. In particular, policy-makers should choose a subsidy for
green variants as long as their policy target (the share of green output for
the industry) is relatively lax and as long as consumers have strong prefer-
ences for polluting products and have a high love of variety. Subsidies are the
actual instrument of choice in several prominent policy settings, e.g. in the
case of Californian ZEV policy or in European approaches to foster electricity
generation from renewable sources. The model also yields implications for
other scenarios. If, for example, consumers initially have a very green bias,
but change their preferences from green to dirty variants over time, then
the initial green share in consumption and production can be sustained in a
welfare optimal manner by adjusting policy instruments over time, starting
with a tax on the dirty goods and eventually switching to a subsidy for green
variants.
The following section introduces the model. Section 3 derives the welfare
ranking between the two policy instruments. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider an industry with two sectors – green (indicated byˆ) and dirty –
where market conditions are characterised by increasing returns to scale in
production and by diﬀerentiated goods.5 We take a general approach to en-
vironmental damage by assuming that it can be associated either with the
consumption or the production of goods, thus depending solely on output vol-
ume. The industry has a large number of potential product variants (ﬁrms)
in both sectors, ˆ N and N, which enter symmetrically into demand. The
number of variants actually produced are ˆ n < ˆ N and n < N. Consumers
demand both green and dirty products. In particular, utility – identical for
















5This section presents a straightforward application of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) to the
issue at hand.
4where 0 < µ < 1 is the love of variety parameter and ˆ cj is the consumption
of green good j, while ci is the consumption of dirty good i.6 Maximisation
of (1) yields that consumers will spend a constant share 1 ¡ ® and ® of
their income on green and dirty products respectively. Furthermore, the
inter-sectoral elasticity of substitution between green and dirty products is
1, while the intra-sectoral elasticity of substitution within each sector turns
out to be 1
1¡µ. In terms of the example introduced above, this would imply
that, even though gasoline and ZEV cars are substitutes, varieties of zero
emission cars from diﬀerent producers are closer substitutes than gasoline
and ZEV cars are.
The inverse demand functions, P(ˆ xi) and P(xi) are calculated by max-
imising the utility stemming from each sector. Focusing on the dirty sector,
and realising that without any policy, the results for the two sectors are iden-




¢® ¡ ¸(p1c1 + ¢¢¢ + pici + ¢¢¢ + pncn ¡ ®(w + R),
where pi is the price of good i, w is the economy wide wage rate and R is
either redistributed green tax revenue (R > 0) or taxes raised in order to
pay the green subsidy (R < 0). Due to the large number of ﬁrms assumed,
individual ﬁrms do not realise the impact of their price on overall sales. The











¢¡® is assumed to be constant, and xi is the single ﬁrm’s
output.
Finally, goods market clearing requires ci =
xi
L and similarly ˆ ci =
ˆ xi
L,
where L is the total number of consumers assumed identical to the total
labour force.
The cost function is identical for all ﬁrms in both sectors, li(xi) = (f +
¯xi), where li is labour, the only factor of production; where f is the ﬁxed
costs of production; and where ¯ is marginal costs. It is straightforward to
use f and ˆ f for the two sectors throughout the analysis. However, analytical
solutions for the utility comparisons would become cumbersome and thus we
ignore this possibility here. Labour market clearing requires
P
li+
Pˆ lj = L.
Equilibrium is characterised by prices, per ﬁrm output and the number
of ﬁrms. Due to symmetry we can restrict our analysis to one variant (ﬁrm),
6As explained in Section 1, the speciﬁcation of U contains no explicit treatment of
pollution or environmental quality. Yet, including a level parameter of the environmental
state, which depends on the ratio of green to dirty output and which is targeted exoge-
nously by the government, does not aﬀect our results, as long as it constitutes a monotone
transformation of utility.
5hence, omitting the subscripts i and j for the two sectors respectively. In the
absence of any policy instrument, the proﬁt of a ﬁrm in the dirty sector is7
¼ = P(x)x ¡ (f + ¯x)w : (3)
Using the fact that c = x






Under free entry and exit of ﬁrms, equating the proﬁt-maximising price with
the price implied by zero proﬁts, p0 =
(f+¯x)w





Finally, the number of ﬁrms actually producing in equilibrium can be deduced
via market clearing using the x and p just derived. In particular, pxn =





Similarly, for the green sector ˆ pˆ xˆ n = (1¡®)(wL+R) must hold, which yields
ˆ n =
(1 ¡ ®)L(1 ¡ µ)
f
: (7)
Accordingly, the percentage of dirty products produced/consumed8 is
given by Â = xn
ˆ xˆ n+xn, which, after setting in the above values – and in ac-
cordance with intuition – turns out as Â = ®. Now an environmental policy
target, in the sense of the cases discussed in the introduction, is a restriction,
¯ Â, on the share of dirty products which can be deﬁned as
¯ Â = °Â = °® ; (8)
where ° 2 (0;1] measures how tough the policy target is.
7Parallel to footnote 6 pollution is not explicit in production (or consumption) and
thus neither is there abatement, nor are there innovation activities by ﬁrms. Yet entry,
exit and scale decisions of ﬁrms constitute the switch from dirty to green production.
8It does not matter whether the environmentally harmful eﬀect is associated with the
consumption or production of the products of the dirty sector.
6Taxing the dirty sector
Once a tax, t, is imposed in order to reduce consumption/production of
products from the dirty sector, the proﬁt function reads ¼t = (1¡t)P(x)xt¡
(f + ¯xt)w, with the subscript t indicating the taxation case. Maximisation





Hence a tax of dirty products raises the price, and producers shift the entire
tax to consumers, such that the realised producer prices ((1 ¡ t)pt), remain
unaﬀected. Equating the new proﬁt-maximising price with the zero proﬁts





which turns out to be unchanged compared to the base case (5) . Yet as
prices have risen, some ﬁrms must be driven out of business. The number
of ﬁrms actually producing is deduced via the market clearing condition
ptxtnt = ®(wL + Rt), where Rt is the tax revenue, that is redistributed in
a lump-sum fashion. In particular, since all dirty variants behave identically
and since all dirty variants are taxed, we can write Rt = tptxtnt. Solving the
market clearing condition gives
nt =
®L(1 ¡ t)(1 ¡ µ)
(1 ¡ ®t)f
; (11)
which turns out to be less than the number of dirty sector ﬁrms in the
base case, i.e. nt < n, since 1¡t
1¡®t < 1. Also, the actual tax revenue can
be calculated as Rt = tw®L
1¡®t. For the green sector, even though there is no
eﬀect on prices and per-ﬁrm quantity from a taxation of the dirty sector
(ˆ pt = ˆ p; ˆ xt = ˆ x), there is still a spillover via the raised and redistributed tax
revenue. The market clearing condition reads ˆ ptˆ xtˆ nt = (1 ¡ ®)(wL + Rt),
where Rt has the value just derived. Hence,
ˆ nt =
(1 ¡ ®)L(1 ¡ µ)
(1 ¡ ®t)f
; (12)
which is greater than ˆ n. Thus taxing the dirty sector promotes entry into
the green sector via the redistributed tax revenue.
Finally, the tax level, ¯ t, that obtains the mix between dirty and green
products aimed at by policy target (8) can be calculated from Â¯ t =
xtnt





Thus, with an absence of policy (° = 1) the tax becomes zero, while with a
very strict policy (° ! 0) the tax becomes one, i.e. the upper feasible limit
of an ad valorem tax.
Subsidising the green sector
Now assume that a subsidy, s, is imposed in order to boost the green sector,
still maintaining the ultimate policy target of achieving a mix between dirty
and green sector of ¯ Â. With a subsidy the proﬁt in the green sector becomes
ˆ ¼s = ˆ psˆ xs ¡(f + ¯ˆ xs)w +sˆ xt, whereby the subscript s indicates that we are





Hence the subsidy reduces the price for consumers. In fact, ﬁrms, since they
act in a sense as monopolists and since the subsidy decreases marginal costs,
have passed the subsidy on to consumers with a factor 1
µ. Thus the operating
surplus of ﬁrms in the green sector must have decreased. Accordingly, since
each ﬁrm still has to recover its ﬁxed production costs, f, product runs must
increase. Setting the price derived in (14) equal to the price implied by zero
proﬁts veriﬁes this point. In particular,
ˆ xs =
µwf
(1 ¡ µ)(¯w ¡ s)
; (15)
which is larger than ˆ x given implicitly in (5). The number of ﬁrms actually
producing is deduced via the market clearing condition ˆ psˆ xsˆ ns = (1¡®)(wL+
Rs), where Rs = ¡sˆ xsˆ ns is the tax revenue that must be raised with a lump
sum tax in order to be able to pay the subsidy to the green sector. Solving
the market clearing condition gives
ˆ ns =
(1 ¡ ®)L(1 ¡ µ)(¯w ¡ s)
f (¯w ¡ s(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)µ))
; (16)
which can be shown to be less than the number of green sector ﬁrms in the
base case, i.e. ˆ ns < ˆ n. The actual tax revenue that has to be raised in order
9Notice that in line with commonly implemented policies, we compare an ad valorem
tax to a unit subsidy. See Delipalla and Keen (1992) for a general comparison of unit
versus ad valorem instruments under imperfect competition.
8to pay the subsidies is Rs =
¡s(1¡®)Lµw
¯w¡s(1¡(1¡®)µ). So the subsidy – contrary to
common intuition – does not generate any entry to the green sector, instead
ﬁrms produce a larger output run each. In addition, since tax revenue must
be raised to pay the subsidy, consumer spending power is reduced, and hence
there are even fewer ﬁrms than in the benchmark case. Furthermore, in the
dirty sector, even though prices and per ﬁrm output are unaﬀected by a
subsidy of the green sector, the number of ﬁrms is not. Since the revenue
demand for the subsidy aﬀects income spent on dirty products as well, after
solving psxsns = ®(wL + Rs), one has
ns =
®L(1 ¡ µ)(¯w ¡ s)
f(¯w ¡ s(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)µ))
; (17)
which is, apart from the factor ®, identical to (16). This means that
the reduction of ﬁrms in the dirty sector occurs solely because of the lump-
sum tax on income, which aﬀects both sectors. Or put diﬀerently, under the
– admittedly unrealistic – assumption that the subsidy to the green sector
was collected exogenous to the model, then a subsidy policy would leave the
number of ﬁrms in both sectors unaﬀected, but would only boost the output
of green ﬁrms compared to dirty ﬁrms by cutting the price of green goods.
Finally, the subsidy, ¯ s, that leads to the mix between dirty and green
products aimed at by policy target (8), is calculated from Â¯ s = xsns
ˆ xsˆ ns+xsns =
¯ Â = °®. Setting in the values from above gives




thus with no policy (° = 1) the subsidy becomes zero, while for a very strict
policy (° ! 0) the subsidy becomes so large that it completely compensates
the marginal cost of producers.
3 Results
Before actual utility levels can be calculated, the tax rate ¯ t deﬁned in (13)
has to be set into the expressions for the number of ﬁrms (11) and (12).
Similarly, the subsidy ¯ s deﬁned in (18) has to be set into the per ﬁrm quantity
expression (15) and the number of ﬁrms expressions (16) and (17). Utilising
market clearing, i.e. the fact that c = x
L, the resulting values can be set
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The terms in (19) and (20) show the utility portions stemming from the
consumption of green and dirty goods respectively; as well as the various
n and x applied. Recall that both expressions are derived under the same
policy constraint, i.e. under the condition that they result in exactly the same
target level of dirty to green products in consumption/production, namely
¯ Â. Yet the resulting utility levels diﬀer. Figure 1 illustrates two numerical
examples of (19) and (20). In Figure 1a the initial share of dirty product
variants in consumption/production is relatively low (® = 0:3). In this case,
taxation of the dirty sector is welfare superior to a subsidy of the green
sector for the whole range of policy targets °. In Figure 1b, the situation is
characterised by a relatively large ®. In this case the taxation of the dirty
sector is only welfare superior if the policy target is strict, i.e. ° is small,
otherwise a subsidisation of the green varieties is welfare superior. From (19)
and (20) a number of results can be stated.
Proposition 1. For a suﬃciently tough green policy target, taxing the dirty
sector is welfare superior to subsidising the green sector. In particular,
lim
°!0
U¯ t > lim
°!0
U¯ s :
Proof is given in Appendix A.1. Proposition 1 establishes that for very
strict policy targets, that is, small °, the taxation of the dirty sector is
preferable to a subsidy for the green sector. The reason is that a close to
complete removal of the dirty sector in the subsidy case can only be driven
by a very harsh lump-sum tax requirement on income. Under a taxation of
the dirty sector, however, consumption/production of the dirty output can
be eliminated relatively eﬃciently via the price increase.
Proposition 2. If the initial situation features a small share of dirty pro-
duction/consumption, then taxing the dirty sector is welfare superior to sub-




) U¯ t > U¯ s 8 ° 2 (0;1) :
Proof is given in appendix A.2. Proposition 2 establishes that if the role
of dirty products in production/consumption is relatively unimportant in the
initial (no policy) situation, then a further reduction of dirty products is best
achieved via taxation of the dirty sector.
10Figure 1: Utility under a tax and a subsidy








Figure 1a: L = 100; f = 1; ¯ = 0:5; ® = 0:3; µ = 0:6
U¯ s
U¯ t






Figure 1b: L = 100; f = 1; ¯ = 0:5; ® = 0:5; µ = 0:3
U¯ t
U¯ s
Proposition 3. If the initial situation features a large share of dirty pro-
duction/consumption, then there exists a critical level of policy, °c, such that
for policies tougher than °c taxing the dirty sector is welfare superior and for










U¯ t > U¯ s ; ° 2 (0;°c)
U¯ t = U¯ s ; ° = °c
U¯ t < U¯ s ; ° 2 (°c;1) :
Proof is given in Appendix A.3. Proposition 3 establishes that if the share
of dirty variants, ®, is greater than the critical value µ
1+µ the superior policy
tool depends on how strict a quota is chosen.
11Figure 1 illustrates propositions 2 and 3. Figure 1a shows a Proposition 2
situation (a situation where ® < µ
1+µ), while Figure 1b features a Proposition
3 situation. In particular, in ﬁgure 1b a taxation of the dirty sector is only
welfare superior if the policy target is very strict, i.e. if ° is small. The two
curves intersect at °c.
The critical value µ
1+µ in propositions 2 and 3 lies between 0 and 1
2 and is
determined by the love of variety parameter, µ 2 (0;1), or alternatively the
intra-sectoral elasticity of substitution, 1
1¡µ. In particular, for µ close to zero,
products are strongly diﬀerentiated, i.e. love of variety matters signiﬁcantly.
In the extreme case, higher quantities do not contribute any utility. The
critical value µ
1+µ becomes zero. Then, any share of income, ®, consumers
spend on the dirty variants, will be suﬃciently large to fulﬁll Proposition 3. In
such a situation, the subsidy is the welfare-superior instrument for moderate
green targets. What brings about this result? Within the model, when µ is
close to zero, only a comparison of the number of ﬁrms n¯ t; ˆ n¯ t; n¯ s and ˆ n¯ s
matters, because this is what determines variety. Now, the tax instrument
has the disadvantage that – even though revenues are redistributed – it results
in a severe reduction in the number of dirty variants, compensated for by only
a slight increase in the number of green variants. In contrast, a subsidy policy
results in only a moderate (and equal) reduction in the number of variants
in both sectors, driven only by the lump-sum tax requirement.
Similarly consider the case of µ close to 1. Now, there is little love of
variety, products are close substitutes and quantities matter. In this case,
if ® < 1
2, we are in Proposition 2 (taxes are always welfare superior) and if
® > 1
2, Proposition 3 applies. The intuition is as follows: when consumption
of dirty products is relatively unimportant (® < 1
2), the tax instrument
is always preferred, since it shrinks the dirty sector relatively eﬀectively,
i.e. the number of dirty variants/ﬁrms decreases and prices increase. And
it allows consumers to spend the redistributed revenue on green products
instead. In contrast, if consumer preferences are such that dirty output is
relatively important (® > 1
2), then the subsidy is preferable for moderate
policy targets (Proposition 3), because it leaves prices and quantities of the
dirty variants unaﬀected and leads to an increase in quantities of the green
products. Variety in both sectors decreases, but due to µ being close to 1,
this hardly aﬀects welfare.
Policy Implications
Before we highlight some of the policy implications of these results, recall
once more the limitations of the model. In our setting major real world
phenomena are ignored, including for example the possibility of a second
12industry which may be superior in terms of environmental quality compared
to the so-called green sector, say public transport compared to cars. Also,
second-best eﬀects from/on other taxes or subsides are ignored. Furthermore,
the import and export of product variants and international spill-overs of
environmental eﬀects have not been dealt with. Thus, our ﬁndings are a
ﬁrst step in analysing environmental policy that targets the ratio of dirty to
green products, and as such capture some developments observable in the
real world.
Our results show that welfare under a green policy target depends on
the choice of instruments, on the strictness of the policy target, and on con-
sumers’ preferences. Preferences are reﬂected in the substitution elasticities
between dirty and green varieties and in the intra-sectoral substitution elas-
ticity, i.e. consumers’ love of variety.
The model, on the one hand, oﬀers an explanation for current policy
approaches which target green quotas for speciﬁc sectors. One of our results
is that policy-makers should choose subsidies for green variants in cases where
consumers prefer polluting products, have a high love of variety and where
the target is not strict. All these factors can be observed in the Californian
ZEV policy (CARB, 2002) and, as a matter of fact, subsidies are the actual
tool chosen by Californian policy-makers. This is in contrast to standard
economic reasoning, which would typically favor the direct policy tool, i.e.
tax the item you want less of. Put diﬀerently, our model shows that subsidies,
which in political economy settings – or in fact the debate surrounding the
ZEV policy – could have been regarded as vote-buying tools, turn out to be
justiﬁed from a consumer utility point of view.
Furthermore, programmes to foster electric power generation from renew-
able sources in Europe also rely on subsidies, e.g. the price supports of the
German Renewable Energies Act, in order to achieve a green quota target.
Markets for electricity, however, are rather oligopolistic and their analysis
would therefore need a diﬀerent competitive outset.
On the other hand, we can also state policy implications for other scenar-
ios. If, for example, policy-makers want to tighten their quota targets over
time, but the inherent bias towards the dirty varieties in consumers’ utility
does not change, then a very strict policy target is best – in terms of welfare –
obtained by taxing the dirty variants. Another possible scenario is a change
in consumer preferences from green to dirty, as is e.g. revealed in Germany
for reusable beverage containers.10 Then a high green policy target can only
10According to the Federal Environmental Ministry (BMU), the actual quota of reusable
out of total beverage containers declined from 71.69% in 1991 to 63.81% in 2001. See
Federal Environmental Ministry (2002).
13be sustained in a welfare optimal manner by adjusting policy instruments
over time and in parallel to consumers behavior, starting with taxing the
dirty variants and then switching to a subsidy for the green products.
4 Conclusions
This paper compares subsidies and taxes as instruments to achieve a green
quota target. Such quotas are frequently designed as the production or
consumption ratio between environmentally friendly and polluting products
within one industry. We examine such policy in a monopolistic competition
setting, where we assume that the green quota target is set exogenously by
policy-makers. We ﬁnd that welfare depends on the choice of policy instru-
ments, on the strictness of the policy target, and on consumers’ preferences.
If the green quota is very strict, meaning that dirty variants should be nearly
banned from the market, then a tax is the welfare-dominant tool, regardless
of substitution elasticities in consumers’ utility. For a wide range of moderate
policy targets, however, a subsidy will be superior as long as consumers pre-
fer dirty over green variants. A tax is only superior for achieving a moderate
quota if the initial consumption of dirty goods is low.
These results help interpret some of the current environmental policy
measures and their implementation, e.g. the Californian Zero Emission Bill
for cars or the European Action Plan for Renewable Energy Sources. It also
gives some valuable hints for the taxes-versus-subsidies choice, if product
diﬀerentiation, entry of ﬁrms and love of variety determine market equilibria.
Certainly there are also other policy tools applicable for achieving green
quotas, e.g. voluntary agreements or price supports, and moreover, other
strategic choices are available to ﬁrms. We leave the investigation of these
issues to future research.
14A Appendix
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. lim°!0 U¯ t > lim°!0 U¯ s.
















the transformations v¯ t and v¯ s respectively.








° + µ ¡ °µ
: (A.2)
For ° ! 0 one has: lim°!0 v¯ t = 1; lim°!0 v¯ s = 0.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. ® < µ
1+µ ) U¯ t > U¯ s 8 ° 2 [0;1).
Consider the comparison of the transformations v¯ t and v¯ s given in (A.1)
and (A.2). Since v¯ t and v¯ s have the same value, (1 ¡ ®)1¡®, and slope,
¡®(1 ¡ ®)1¡®, for ° ! 1 the curvature of the two function for ° ! 1 is
decisive for the welfare ranking. Twice diﬀerentiating (A.1) and (A.2) with






























Hence, v¯ t is convex in ° = 1, and in fact for the entire parameter range (see
separate appendix). Equating (A.3) and (A.4) yields the critical level of ®¤ =
11A detailed separate appendix is available from the authors upon request.
15µ





















and hence v¯ s is more convex than v¯ t. Accordingly
v¯ s must lie below v¯ t and hence U¯ t > U¯ s.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. ® > µ
1+µ ) 9 °c 2 (0;1) : U¯ t > U¯ s;° 2 (0;°c); U¯ t = U¯ s;° =
°c ; U¯ t < U¯ s;° 2 (°c;1).
Consider the comparison of the transformations v¯ t and v¯ s given in (A.1) and





















of ® > ®¤. Hence, v¯ t is more convex than v¯ s for ° = 1 and accordingly v¯ s
must lie above v¯ t for ° ! 1. Since lim°!0 v¯ t > lim°!0 v¯ s (Appendix A.1) the
two functions must cross at some °c 2 (0;1). Accordingly, v¯ s > v¯ t, implying
U¯ s > U¯ t, for ° 2 (°c;1) and v¯ s < v¯ t, implying U¯ s < U¯ t, for ° 2 (0;°c).
Uniqueness of °c 2 (0;1) is proven in a separate appendix, available from the
authors upon request.
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